Peacekeeping scale of assessments

A scale of assessments separate from the scale of assessments for the regular programme budget applies to the apportionment of the requirements for UN peacekeeping operations.

History

The first UN peacekeeping missions were relatively small operations, and their expenses were (and continue to be) funded through the regular budget. The establishment of large, expensive missions such as the UN Emergency Force in 1956 and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960 created a financial crisis in the UN, in which many Member States refused to shoulder the costs of the missions as part of their regular budget assessments. The matter was referred to the International Court of Justice, which issued a landmark advisory opinion in July 1962 indicating that the costs associated with peacekeeping were in fact expenses of the Organization under Article 17.2 of the Charter.

A special account separate from the regular budget was established for ONUC in 1961. In 1963, after the issuance of the ICJ advisory opinion the General Assembly adopted general principles for the financing of peacekeeping operations, but was unable to reach agreement on the consistent application of those principles, even after the establishment of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) in 1965 to "undertake a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization". It was not until 1973 that a more consistent method of apportioning expenses of peacekeeping operations was established, which held until 2000 with the establishment of the present system.

Principles

The principles underpinning the peacekeeping scale were established in resolution 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, as follows:

(a) The financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations;

(b)Whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute to peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures;
(c) Without prejudice to the principle of collective responsibility, every effort should be made to encourage voluntary contributions from Member States;
(d) The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be borne in mind in connexion with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations;

(e) Where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those who are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation;

The current approach to calculating the peacekeeping scale was established in resolution 55/235 of 23 December 2000.

Calculation

The present peacekeeping scale is the result of the application of a system of discounts, based on the three-year average per capita GNI, to the regular budget scale, as follows:

Level	Criteria	Discount
A	Permanent members of the Security Council	pro rata premium
B	All Member States other than those in Level A or Levels C through J	No discount
C	Member States listed I the annex to resolution 55/235**	7.5%
D	Member States with per capita GNI less than 2x world average	20%
E	Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.8x world average	40%
F	Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.6x world average	60%
G	Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.4x world average	70%
H	Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.2x world average	70% or 80%
I	Member States with per capita GNI below world average	80%
J	Least-developed countries	90%

Level C

Level C is defined by resolution 55/235 as consisting of Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, UAE.

In 2010-2012, the Bahamas and Bahrain, which graduated to level B in 2004, were exceptionally granted the same discount as level C while remaining in level B. In 2013-2015, the Bahamas, Bahrain and Oman were exceptionally granted the same discount as level C while remaining in level B.

Transition periods

Under resolution 55/235, countries "graduating" to levels with lower levels of discount can qualify for a gradual phase-in of the higher rate; those increasing by two levels have two years to phase in their new rate while those increasing by three or more will have the rate phased in over three years.

Recent reports and resolutions

Every three years, the Secretariat issues a report on the implementation of resolutions 55/235 and 55/236 containing effective rates of assessment based on updated economic data. After the General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the peacekeeping scale, an addendum to the report is issued with the actual approved rates of assessment.

Resolution	Rates	Scale period	Notes
	A/76/296/Rev.1	2022-2024
73/272 of 22 December 2018	A/73/350/Add.1	2019-2021	Level B countries Bahamas, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia afforded exceptional 7.5% discount
70/246 of 23 December 2015	A/70/331/Add.1	2016-2018	Level B countries Bahamas, Bahrain and Oman afforded exceptional 7.5% discount; Saudi Arabia receives 7.5% discount for 2018 only
67/239 of 24 December 2012	A/67/224/Add.1	2013-2015	Level B countries Bahamas, Bahrain and Oman receive exceptional 7.5% discount
64/249 of 24 December 2009	A/64/220/Add.1	2010-2012	Level B countries Bahamas and Bahrain exceptionally treated as level C
61/243 of 22 December 2006	A/61/139/Add.1	2007-2009
58/256 of 23 December 2003	A/58/157/Add.1	2004-2006
55/235 and 55/236 of 23 December 2000	A/C.5/55/38/Add.1	2001-2003	New system of discounts established

See also

• Scale of assessments